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Abstract
Community-based management and the establishment of marine reserves have been advocated worldwide as means to
overcome overexploitation of fisheries. Yet, researchers and managers are divided regarding the effectiveness of these
measures. The ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ model is often accepted as a universal paradigm, which assumes that unless
managed by the State or privatized, common-pool resources are inevitably overexploited due to conflicts between the self-
interest of individuals and the goals of a group as a whole. Under this paradigm, the emergence and maintenance of
effective community-based efforts that include cooperative risky decisions as the establishment of marine reserves could
not occur. In this paper, we question these assumptions and show that outcomes of commons dilemmas can be complex
and scale-dependent. We studied the evolution and effectiveness of a community-based management effort to establish,
monitor, and enforce a marine reserve network in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Our findings build on social and ecological
research before (1997–2001), during (2002) and after (2003–2004) the establishment of marine reserves, which included
participant observation in .100 fishing trips and meetings, interviews, as well as fishery dependent and independent
monitoring. We found that locally crafted and enforced harvesting rules led to a rapid increase in resource abundance.
Nevertheless, news about this increase spread quickly at a regional scale, resulting in poaching from outsiders and a
subsequent rapid cascading effect on fishing resources and locally-designed rule compliance. We show that cooperation for
management of common-pool fisheries, in which marine reserves form a core component of the system, can emerge,
evolve rapidly, and be effective at a local scale even in recently organized fisheries. Stakeholder participation in monitoring,
where there is a rapid feedback of the systems response, can play a key role in reinforcing cooperation. However, without
cross-scale linkages with higher levels of governance, increase of local fishery stocks may attract outsiders who, if not
restricted, will overharvest and threaten local governance. Fishers and fishing communities require incentives to maintain
their management efforts. Rewarding local effective management with formal cross-scale governance recognition and
support can generate these incentives.
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Introduction
Coastal fishing communities are increasingly exposed to global
market pressures, making them more vulnerable to ‘‘roving
bandits’’ who can deplete local fishing stocks and move on to
other areas to do the same [1], seriously threatening ecosystems
and the people who depend on them to survive [2,3], especially
those located in developing countries [4]. To overcome the threat
of roving bandits and overexploitation of fisheries, international
financial organizations and some national governments are
investing huge sums to foster the establishment of marine reserves
and community-based management (CBM) [5,6].
The research community, however, is divided regarding the
potential effectiveness of CBM for developing sustainable fisheries
[7]. The capabilities of managing coastal fisheries locally, although
well documented [8–11] have often been ignored or criticized,
viewed as relics that are irrelevant to contemporary situations
[12,7]. Indeed, local fisheries are rapidly appearing and—just as
rapidly—disappearing in response to emerging global markets and
overfished stocks [1], leaving little time to develop effective
customary management practices with which to avoid local
overexploitation. Many fishery officials and scholars still accept
‘‘the tragedy of the commons’’ model [13] that assumes that due to
conflicts between the self-interest of members of a group and the
goals of a group as a whole, common-pool resources need to be
managed by the State or privatized to avoid overexploitation.
Under this paradigm, the emergence and maintenance of effective
community-based efforts that include costly and risky decisions as
the establishment of marine reserves would not occur, particularly
in recently organized fisheries.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 July 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 7 | e6253In this study, we question these assumptions and show that the
realities of commons dilemmas can be complex and scale
dependent. Recently organized fisheries have the potential to
develop effective community-based management practices that
include the establishment of marine reserves. However, we also
show that CBM can collapse when local communities lack linkages
to higher levels of governance that help legitimize their
organizational efforts [14]. We illustrate the potential for rapid
rise and fall of communal self-governance in young fisheries
through an effort for CBM of a network of marine reserves in
Northwest Mexico.
Based on extensive ecological and social studies conducted
prior, during, and after reserve establishment, we observed the
evolution of CBM efforts in a recently organized inshore fishery of
the Gulf of California, Mexico. These efforts - which included the
establishment of a marine reserve network and locally enforced
harvesting rules - led to a substantial and documented increase in
local resource abundance [15]. The network includes an offshore
reserve surrounding an island and two coastal reserves, providing
protection to roughly 30% of a fishing sector’s fishing grounds
(Fig. 1). Reserves were created by a cooperative of 22 commercial
divers of Puerto Pen ˜asco, a fishing and tourism hub located in the
northeastern portion of the Gulf of California, as a means to
protect and enhance mollusk stocks, particularly rock scallops
(Spondylus calcifer) and black murex snails (Hexaplex nigritus), two
staple resources of commercial divers [16–18]. The divers’
cooperative has been harvesting benthic shellfish from rocky reefs
and adjacent sandy areas for approximately 30 years [19]. The
cooperative is comprised of no more than two generations of
divers (age range 24–58 yrs) who arrived from communities south
of Puerto Pen ˜asco in the late 1970’s [19]. While the fishing
cooperative in its current structure was formally established in
2001, some members belonged to a similar cooperative before that
and had been harvesting benthic resources since the late 1970s.
Some of these older fishers were leaders in the new cooperative
and played an important role in creating management measures.
Local divers created and enforced the reserves while working
closely with researchers from a local non-governmental conserva-
tion organization (Centro Intercultural de Estudios de Desiertos y
Oce ´anos) and an academic institution (the University of Arizona)
to design and implement a monitoring program for their fisheries
(Cudney-Bueno worked with these institutions and the cooperative
Figure 1. Community-based marine reserve network of Puerto Pen ˜asco and sequential phases of poaching. During the first phase
(green), divers from other locations, ‘‘roving bandits’’, poached on the San Jorge Island reserve. This was followed by local rule breaking and some
divers from Puerto Pen ˜asco poaching on the Island (second phase, pink arrows). During the third phase (yellow), all members of the Puerto Pen ˜asco
diving cooperative broke their local rules and coastal reserves were targeted. It took less than two months for rules to be broken by all local divers
after entrance of roving bandits.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006253.g001
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tional meetings and leading the monitoring program with
commercial divers). Fishers approached these institutions in 1998
to help conduct population assessments and biological studies of
their fisheries. Close collaboration between fishers, researchers,
and local institutions emerged, leading to the subsequent design,
establishment, and enforcement of the network of marine reserves
four years after this collaboration began [19]. The network was
designed by fishers based on their knowledge of local currents, of
differences in densities of mollusks, and recollection of previous
abundant sites that the cooperative wanted to see rebound.
Researchers worked with fishers to help bridge their local
knowledge with experimental design and establish a monitoring
program to measure changes within and outside the reserves [19].
Reserve establishment occurred without waiting for official
government recognition at a time when other efforts for the
establishment and management of marine reserves in the region
had been highly conflictive [20].
Undoubtedly, the presence of researchers and an NGO played
an important role in facilitating the establishment of reserves.
However, we do not elaborate on the conditions or the relative
importance of factors that led to the establishment of reserves since
this is discussed elsewhere [19] and is forthcoming work. Instead,
we describe the main components of the CBM system, its effects
on local resources and cooperation, as well as the processes and
factors leading to a downfall in local governance and subsequent
effects on resources protected. We discuss these results in the
context of the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ paradigm and emerging
worldwide efforts to foster CBM of fisheries.
Results
Local Management of the Commons
Community-based management of the marine reserve network
relied primarily on a suite of simple rules and means of
enforcement, leadership of key individuals, meeting venues that
allowed for social and ecological feedbacks, and capitalizing on the
region’s physical and environmental characteristics.
Formal and Informal Rules and Sanctions. Fishers
designed, monitored, and enforced three main forms of rules:
resource-based rules (snail fishing banned June and July; fishing
banned within reserves), monitoring rules (mandatory
participation in and financial contributions for monitoring) and
administrative rules (mandatory: participation in cooperative
meetings, monthly financial contributions to the cooperative,
and timely provision of paperwork for cooperative). These rules
and their sanctions were built primarily on foundations of trust
and reciprocity and concerns for the group’s well being. Hence,
the most effective and usual form of enforcement relied on
variations of peer pressure and public shame. This, in essence,
could ultimately threaten the rule-breaker’s reputation and his
social bonds and norms—also known as social capital [21]—with
the rest of the members of the group. These were de facto sanctions
with no legal standing under the statutes of the cooperative. While
other formal sanction types were developed, they were either
largely avoided, often changed, or were applied last (Table 1). On
occasions, local government officials provided enforcement
support that was based entirely on the rapport built between
fishers and officials, as reserves were yet to be formalized by the
government.
To exemplify this, 100% of fishers interviewed said that they
trusted that other fellow fishers for the most part respected the
reserves. Similarly, when asked the open ended question ‘‘In what
way would breaking cooperative rules affect you?’’ all answers fell
into three categories: 1) personal guilt and sense of betrayal to the
group, 2) concern of the rest of the group’s opinion about one’s
actions, and 3) concern over the possibility of losing trust and
friendship.
If someone within the group cheated, the first approach of
members of the cooperative was to tap into the personal guilt
associated with the event. Often, it was only necessary to bring the
case to the attention of the group without singling out specific
people. ‘‘Cheaters’’ assumed that at least someone else likely knew
who the culprit was. This way, the informer’s reputation was also
protected and he would not be labeled as an accuser. ‘‘Accuser’’ is
one of the worst labels a commercial diver can have, largely
because it can undermine his network ties and reliance on these
ties when in need of any help. During interviews, when given a
choice to express what would be worse, for the group to label you
as an accuser or as a cheater, practically all divers found it
impossible to make a choice. They were both seen as equally
detrimental.
Role of Leadership and Cooperative Meetings. When
direct accusations in front of the group did take place, however,
these were carried out by the more elder or experienced divers
who had already gained high levels of respect within the group.
These individuals played a pivotal role during meetings. They
gave credibility to agreements and helped maintain, although
often contentious, a respectful meeting atmosphere. They were
Table 1. Formal and informal sanctions by rule type devised by local fishers.
Rule Type Sanction Types Formal (F)/Informal (I)
Resource-based rules On site warnings and verbal confrontations I
Peer pressure/public shame during meetings I
Threats of temporary confiscation of boat F
Threats of expulsion from the cooperative F
Monitoring rules Peer pressure/public shame during meetings I
Extend rule breaker’s monitoring responsibilities F
Administrative rules Peer pressure/public shame during meetings I
Threat of expulsion from cooperative after 3 faults F
Temporary confiscation of boat F
Expulsion from the cooperative F
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006253.t001
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site when found breaking any given rule.
Cooperative meetings encompassed a key component for the
evolution of cooperation and maintenance of checks and balances.
Between summer 2002 and summer 2004, 15 meetings were held,
all with an attendance of at least 80% of members. More than
acting as a means to discuss various issues pertaining to
administration, these meetings provided the main venue to
maintain the checks and balances of the system and its
functionality. They provided a forum for the development of
trust, the generation of rules and sanctions, and allowed for
collective feedbacks from biological knowledge gained while
commercial diving and/or monitoring. This, in turn, reinforced
among the group the perceived benefits of the reserves and played
a key role in dismissing poaching allegations and re-enforcing
group strength. For instance, it was common for rumors of
poaching to develop and quickly spread within the group.
However, these rumors were usually dismissed during cooperative
meetings. Given that fishers were directly involved in the
monitoring process, with designated individuals repeatedly
monitoring the same areas jointly with academic researchers,
there was a strong sense of individual appropriation towards each
monitored site and of other group members’ respect towards the
reports or opinions of these individuals. Knowing that poaching
allegations were often false and that resources were in good health
would in turn re-enforce the unity and strength of the group and
trust in its members. In short, burden of proof regarding the state
of reserves and fishing areas fell largely on fishers themselves.
Role of the Physical and Environmental Layout. Knowing
if, when, and where a poaching event took place was facilitated by
the region’s physical and environmental layout. It is simple to know
where a diver fishes on a daily basis. The group is small and highly
communicative, allowing for the quick spread of information.
Coastal reserves are found close to port and fishing activities within
them can be easily detected either from shore or from fishing areas.
In addition, diving patterns within any given month are constrained
by environmental factors, particularly tidal currents and visibility.
For instance, during monthly spring tides, when tidal currents are
strongest, divers are largely constrained to dive within the reefs
south of port. During neap tides, they target offshore areas and the
reefs north of port.
In the case of San Jorge Island, which is found farther offshore
and is harder to patrol, enforcement relied on more active means.
These means, however, were geared towards patrolling entrance
of outsiders and not of members of the cooperative. It is quickly
known when a diver from Puerto Pen ˜asco goes to the island as this
trip demands extra preparation and usually involves overnight
stays. Cooperative members would sometimes carry out trips to
the island during neap tides with the sole purpose of seeing if
anyone was there. However, on three occasions when credible
rumors emerged about outsiders poaching, Puerto Pen ˜asco divers
also gained the support of the local Navy and fisheries offices to
assist in patrolling and enforcement operations. This collaboration
was based on the rapport built between divers and local
government officials throughout the years rather than as a
mandate, as reserves were yet to be formalized at a federal level.
The unique environmental characteristics of the region also
facilitated local divers’ efforts to discourage settlement of outsiders.
A case in point is when a prominent Puerto Pen ˜asco buyer hired
divers from another region to work for him at low wages and
increase his revenues. Local divers advised them to fish in areas
and times marked by intense currents and low visibility. These
divers never developed the skills to dive in the region and left soon
after.
Outcomes Strengthen Cooperation
This relatively informal governance system was highly effective.
Regular underwater monitoring visits to reserve sites revealed
minimal evidence of fishing activity within reserves. Finding
evidence of rock scallop fishing is facilitated by the fact that the
right valve remains attached to the rock after the scallop muscle
has been removed and its bright white color contrasts with the rest
of the reef. In the case of black murex snails, these are only
harvested when they form large summer breeding aggregation
mounds [18]. We saw the same aggregations repeatedly in reserve
sites. Similarly, we confirmed only 13 poaching events in at least
2,000 fishing trips conducted between Summer 2002-end of
Spring 2004. Hence, rule compliance was high and accomplished
primarily through means of social pressures rather than through
heavy policing by external officials.
Only two years after the establishment of the reserve network,
populations of black murex and rock scallops had increased
markedly on the San Jorge Island reserve (Fig. 2) [also see 15],
with relative densities of up to 160 individuals per 100 m
2 that
exceed any others reported for the Gulf of California [22,23]. As
has been shown in other cases [24], positive effects were also seen
in fishing areas adjacent to the reserves [15]. Relative densities of
juvenile rock scallop had increased by up to 40.7% within coastal
reserves and by 20.6% in fished areas, and changes were also
evident for black murex, with more than a three-fold increase in
density of juveniles within fished areas [15]. This increase in
density of juveniles, combined with predictions from larval
transport models and field oceanography data, indicate enhanced
recruitment via protection of larval sources within the reserve
network [15].
Data from divers’ catches of rock scallop showed an increase in
average mass of 19.9% (F2, 897=10.78; p,0.0001, 1-way
ANOVA) in the two years since reserve establishment (Fig. 3A).
Similarly, average mass of black murex increased by 74.74% in
reserves (F2, 220=77.75; p,0.001, 1-way ANOVA) and by 35% in
fishing areas (F2, 421=23.80; p,0.001, 1-way ANOVA) (Fig. 3B).
Rapid feedback from fishing resources allowed fishers to expect
future benefits of the group’s various initiatives. In interviews
conducted prior to providing results on monitoring efforts, over
85% of fishers reported benefits from the reserves, wanting to
continue the reserves into the future.
The Fall of Cooperation
Shortly after these initial positive outcomes, local governance
faced severe external challenges in the form of: 1) lack of
recognition at higher levels of government of the local arrange-
ments, 2) abrupt changes in local government leadership, such as
the replacement of the chief of the fishing agency office in Puerto
Pen ˜asco, who was a local himself, and (3) new fishing pressure
from outsiders. News about these community-based management
efforts and the abundance of resources at the reserves spread
quickly at a regional scale. ‘‘Roving bandits’’ from more than
300 km away (along the coastline, eight hours travel by boat)
began fishing the island. Since reserves and territorial use rights
were not formally recognized by the Government, local fishers did
not have the right to expel others from their reserves and de facto
fishing grounds. Doing so could put them and the cooperative at
risk. Furthermore, they no longer had any support of local
government officials, which reduced even more any options
available to cope with the problem. Various cooperative members
confronted outsiders verbally on at least 3 different occasions and
physical confrontation was seriously considered, an option that
was soon dropped as it would have had serious legal consequences
on the cooperative and those involved. Unable to deter poaching,
Fishery Cross-Scale Linkages
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opted to fish there before outsiders finished reaping the benefits of
their own investment. What followed was a rapid cascading effect
on fishing resources and locally-designed rule compliance. The
island quickly became a free for all. In one month, mollusk
populations were reduced in half (Fig. 2). As the island was being
harvested by most cooperative members, local divers who tend to
fish closer to shore also began to target coastal reserves even
without direct pressure from roving bandits in these areas. There
were no incentives to continue protecting coastal reserves knowing
that fellow fishers were obtaining large catches offshore and that
prices would likely fall due to market saturation. Coastal reserves
also became an opportunity to rapidly harvest in a setting with
limited competition from other fellow fishers. In less than two
months since roving bandits first entered the area, all reserves had
been targeted by every member of the cooperative at least once
(Fig. 2 and Table 2).
Social capital that initially allowed for a rapid evolution of
cooperation and self-governance for resource management now
facilitated overexploitation and rule breaking (Table 2). Once most
members of the cooperative had broken some rule, accountability
had been eroded and fishers were no longer willing to hold their
peers accountable for poaching due to strong social ties with them
in other dimensions outside of fishing. Key cooperative members,
for instance, stopped attending meetings in order to avoid
encounters with specific people, at times family related. Between
June 2004 and December 2005, of six cooperative meetings held,
only one had the minimum quorum necessary to make decisions
recognized under the bylaws of the cooperative (50%+1 members).
Discussion
A combination and interaction of three main factors led to the
initial downfall of cooperation within this CBM system: lack of
government recognition, changes in local government leadership,
and entrance of roving bandits. Once rule-breaking had become
prevalent, these factors were further exacerbated by the existing
strong social ties among cooperative members, ties that under
other conditions had been conducive to CBM. Although we
cannot quantify which factor weighed more over the other, not
having formal government recognition of management guidelines
and of fishers’ de facto fishing grounds clearly hampered any means
to cope with roving bandits, clouding any possible incentive to
cooperate. The importance of this recognition in helping to foster
local cooperation is further exemplified with recent developments.
In summer 2006, the Mexican Government granted a fishing
concession to the Puerto Pen ˜asco diving cooperative, providing its
members exclusive access rights to fish rock scallop within what
were before de facto fishing grounds [19]. Rights to the concession
demand adherence to a government recognized management
plan, which includes the establishment of seasonal and area
closures, as well as total allowable catches [19]. Divers are once
again conducting subtidal monitoring, are active participants in
stock assessments to define their annual quota, have defined new
rules for overall governance of the cooperative, and meetings are
regularly held at full quorum [personal communication, Iva ´n
Martı ´nez, Centro Intercultural de Estudios de Desiertos y
Oce ´anos].
The downfall of this CBM effort could be simplistically
attributed to a local tragedy of the commons [13]. Realities and
outcomes of commons dilemmas can, however, be much more
complex and scale-dependent. We have shown that cooperation
for community-based management of a local commons, in which
marine reserves form a core component of the system, can indeed
emerge and evolve rapidly in a fishery with limited collaborative
experience. Locals can find an effective set of rules to self-govern
their marine resources and with which sustainable resource
exploitation is more likely to take place. This cooperation in turn
can be reinforced by perceived rapid positive outcomes of local
management interventions. However, as effective a CBM system
may be at a local scale, it is likely that this effectiveness may only
last as long as the system remains buffered from external pressures.
Figure 2. Rapid rise and fall of San Jorge Island fishery stocks from summer 2002, when the Puerto Pen ˜asco community-based
reserve network was established, to the end of summer 2004, three months after roving bandits poached on the island. The graph
depicts differences in relative densities (S.E. bars included) from one monitoring season to another for the main species harvested: murex snails
(Hexaplex nigritus) and rock scallops (Spondylus calcifer).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006253.g002
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are initially implemented in systems where responses can be
measured rapidly and where there is an existing social base for
reserve establishment. Reserves reduce the total fishing area, initially
render an economic cost to fishers, and complicate management of
risk by reducing the physical spaces available to choose from in
accordancetovariationsinenvironmentalconditionsandthestateof
theirresources. Stakeholderparticipation inmonitoring,where there
is a rapid feedback of the system’s response, can play a key role in
reinforcing cooperation. In this regard, some sessile or semi-sessile
fisheries with rapid growth rates can be good candidates to invest
and promote the emergence of social capital and reserve
establishment. They can provide a fast feedback to fishers and a
setting that can be tinkered with [19,25], eventually leading to
developing some of the factors associated with ways of organizing
activities that are sustainable for the long term [26].
Nevertheless, even if CBM efforts are effective within the local
biophysical and social context, we show that cooperation and strong
social capital alone are not enough to sustain their efficacy. Fishers
and fishing communities need to be granted formal government
recognition of their locally-devised management structures when
they appear to be effective. Higher levels of governance have the
ability to create incentives for the emergence of local cooperation
leading to sustainable resource use. One way of providing incentives
for successful CBM is by rewarding such efforts with formal cross-
scale governance recognition and support.
Figure 3. Changes in length and mass of rock scallops (Spondylus calcifer) and black murex snails (Hexaplex nigritus) before and after
reserve establishment. (a) Comparison of the average adductor muscle length and mass of rock scallops from fishing areas (2002=Spring, two
months before reserve establishment). Data from reserves was not obtained as animals would have needed to be sacrificed. (b) Comparison of the
average live mass of black murex snails from reserve and fishing areas.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006253.g003
Fishery Cross-Scale Linkages
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and buffered fishing communities has largely been lost. Yet, as we
show, effective CBM that includes costly decisions like the
establishment of marine reserves can emerge even in these
settings. Not granting appropriate forms of territorial use rights
nor formally recognizing and giving viability to effective local
management structures and arrangements, as simple or complex
as these may be, could threaten a community’s existing
foundations for sustainable use of fishery resources. In short,
without effective cross-scale institutional arrangements in place
that provide robustness to a CBM system, just as cooperative
behavior can arise it can also fall along with the biological resource
base intended to be managed.
Materials and Methods
Our research followed a mixed method approach that
combined qualitative and quantitative research in the social and
biophysical sciences, including the development of larval dispersal
models to assess reserve effects within and outside of reserves.
Comprehensive results and analyses of the biophysical research are
provided elsewhere [15]. At the broadest level, our findings build
on social and ecological research with commercial divers of Puerto
Pen ˜asco (conducted by Cudney-Bueno) before (1997–2001),
during (2002) and after (2003–2004) the establishment of marine
reserves. This timeframe entails more than 600 days living in
Puerto Pen ˜asco, participation in 147 commercial diving trips, and
attending 30 meetings of the Sociedad Cooperativa Buzos de Puerto
Punta Pen ˜asco, Puerto Pen ˜asco’s divers’ fishing cooperative.
Research was based on principles of participatory research [27],
where stakeholders are actively involved in research and decision-
making. Fishers formed part of the research process by having
designed and established their marine reserves and monitored the
state of their fishery resources within these. Before monitoring
began, commercial divers were trained by R. Cudney-Bueno. All
biological monitoring was conducted by academic researchers in
collaboration with divers.
Following is a summary of the methods used to address the
effects and evolution of the Puerto Pen ˜asco community-based
marine reserve initiative.
Social Qualitative and Quantitative Research
Ethnographic research on the Puerto Pen ˜asco diving fishery
began five years before the establishment of marine reserves,
which allowed us to address social dynamics prior to and after the
establishment of reserves. Between Summer 2003–2004, Cudney-
Bueno conducted fieldwork specifically targeted to address a) if
current collective action for the establishment of marine reserves
developed quickly and with no or very limited previous experience
to define and/or establish collective management decisions, and b)
the conditions that facilitated and led to the establishment of
community-based management efforts. Through oral histories, we
searched for previous cooperative efforts and key past events or
situations that could have shaped fishers’ interests in adopting
more conservation-oriented measures. Oral histories also allowed
us to single out and understand relevant issues that may not be as
clearly or obviously identified with the use of directed questions.
Full results and analyses of this ethnographic research go beyond
the scope of this paper and are in preparation.
We complemented our qualitative research with structured
interviews. Throughout March and at the beginning of April 2004,
we conducted structured interviews with 18 fishers, representing
82% of the members of the diving cooperative of Pen ˜asco. These
interviews primarily addressed perceptions of fishers as to the
effects and efficacy of their management efforts, factors affecting
the evolution of cooperation within the cooperative such as the
building of trust among cooperative members. We conducted all
interviews at fishers’ homes.
Having had the time to build sufficient rapport and trust with
local fishers, it became possible to gain a comprehensive
understanding of the diving fishery, how divers define and enforce
rules and regulations, record the presence or absence of poaching
events, and note if conflict resolution and consensus-building
processes were facilitated or halted.
Quantitative Estimation of Population Parameters
We estimated changes in relative densities of rock scallop
(Spondylus calcifer) and black murex snail (Hexaplex nigritus) in reserve
and fishing sites for two consecutive years beginning in Summer
2002, one month preceding reserve establishment. These species
were selected for being the main species targeted by the
commercial diving fishery and representing the main reason
leading to the establishment of the reserves.
The region monitored encompassed the reefs of San Jorge
Island and those found near the fishing town of Puerto Pen ˜asco
(within 3 km from highest tide line) in the eastern part of the
northern Gulf of California, Mexico. This region extends from
31,22,18.1 N; 113,39,09.4 W to 31,15,03.8 N; 113,20,48.1 W (see
Fig. 1).
We subdivided the region into 5 sampling areas: a) two coastal
reserves, Las Conchas and Sandy; b) two coastal fishing areas, Los
Tanques and La Cholla; c) one offshore island reserve, San Jorge
Island (Fig. 1). We conducted density counts of juveniles and adults
in 58 100 m
2 permanent quadrants distributed randomly across
these 5 sampling areas. To reduce heterogeneity associated with
depth, we restricted all sampling to depths ranging from 40–65 ft.
This also reduced health risks associated with diving and facilitated
overall monitoring as we were able to remain underwater for
longer periods of time. A comprehensive account of methods used
to analyze reserve effects on recruitment within and outside
reserves - which combines results from monitoring data, outputs of
Table 2. Rules and levels of compliance before and after
entrance of roving bandits
{.
Rule Type
Compliance
Time A (Before)
Compliance
Time B (After)
Resource-based rules
Snail fishing banned May-July 1 5
Fishing banned within reserve
network
15
Monitoring rules
Participation in monitoring 1 5
Financial support for monitoring 1 5
Administrative rules
Participation in all meetings 1 4
Monthly financial contribution 2 5
Providing paperwork necessary for
the cooperative
22
{Compliance levels based on percentage of fishers known to have broken the
rule at least once: 1=very low (,10%), 2=low (10–40%), 3=moderate (41–
60%), 4=high (61–90%), 5=very high (.90%). Time A=June 2001–May 2004,
Time B=first six months (June–November 2004) after entrance of roving
bandits.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006253.t002
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elsewhere [15].
Quantitative Estimation of Changes in Size and Mass of
Harvested Species
We estimated changes in the size and mass of adult (harvested)
black murex and rock scallop. For black murex, we collected
specimens (n=244) from breeding aggregations of reserve and
fishing sites before the establishment of reserves (Summer 1999)
and after their establishment (Summer 2003 and 2004). All snails
from reserves were returned to the collecting site, whereas snails
from fishing sites were obtained from fishers’ catches [for details on
sampling black murex see 16].
For rock scallops, we estimated changes in average length and
mass of the adductor muscle, the part of the animal that is
commercialized and that fishers return to port. Since the only way
of obtaining samples of the adductor muscle is by killing the
animal, we limited our samples and analyses to fishing sites. All
samples were constricted to Spring (post reproduction) to avoid
variations in weight and size caused by glycogen accumulation in
the muscle pre and post reproduction [17]. We obtained a total of
1081 samples of rock scallop from Spring 2002 (pre-reserve
establishment) to 2004 [see sampling details in 17]. Both black
murex and rock scallop data were analyzed using a 1-way
ANOVA framework and Tukey’s HSD multiple comparison test
to determine pairwise relationships.
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